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Abstract. We are concerned with the distinction between intrin-
sic and extrinsic justifications for large-cardinal axioms, as outlined
in for example Section 3 of the 1964 version of Go¨del’s essay on
the continuum problem. William Tait and Peter Koellner have
examined the question of which reflection principles can be said
to be intrinsically justified, in the sense of merely unfolding the
content of the iterative conception of set. We formulate a new
reflection principle which subsumes all of the reflection principles
which which were considered by Tait and Koellner and are also
known to be consistent, and which is itself consistent relative to
an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal (because equivalent to the existence of a re-
markable cardinal). We suggest that this principle can be said to
be intrinsically justified in this sense. Initially we say that a cardi-
nal κ is extremely reflective if Vκ satisfies the form of reflection in
question, however it turns out that κ is extremely reflective if and
only if κ is remarkable.
1. Introduction
When speaking of the kinds of justification that may be offered for
accepting some candidate for a new axiom to be adjoined to the stan-
dard axioms for set theory, philosophers of set theory draw a distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic justifications for axioms. It is hard to
get clear about the precise nature of this distinction, but one way to
explain it is to say that an intrinsic justification for a new axiom gives
some reason for thinking that it in some sense asserts something already
implicit in our conception of set, whereas an extrinsic justification is
based on some consideration such as that the axiom has consequences
which are in some way desirable or have been independently verified,
The author was supported by the research grant DE 436/10-1 from Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, while working at the University of Tu¨bingen. Ralf
Schindler provided very helpful assistance with identifying errors in earlier ver-
sions of the paper and providing a useful characterisation of remarkable cardinals
which greatly simplified the argument that a cardinal is extremely reflective if and
only if it is remarkable.
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or that the theory obtained by adjoining the axiom to the standard set
of axioms has properties which are in some way desirable.
One classic account of the distinction is in [14]. In particular, this
essay of Go¨del’s elaborates somewhat on what is meant by “our con-
ception of set” which we spoke of before, making it clear that what is
meant is what is generally called the iterative conception of set. (In
what follows, when speaking of the “iterative conception” of set, we will
always assume that we are speaking of that version of the conception
which entails that every set is well-founded. Thomas Forster [6] has
argued that “iterative conception” can be understood more broadly.)
He writes ‘This concept of set, however, according to which a set is
something obtainable from the integers (or some other well-defined ob-
jects) by iterated application of the operation “set of”... has never
led to any antinomy whatsoever; that is the perfectly “naive” and un-
critical working with this concept of set has so far proved completely
self-consistent’.1 Go¨del then goes on to discuss the program for ex-
tending the existing axioms of set theory by adding axioms asserting
the existence of large cardinals, and elaborates on the distinction be-
tween the two different types of justifications for new axioms, which
has come to be known as the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
justifications.
Writing first of large-cardinal axioms which might be plausibly thought
to be intrinsically justified he writes ‘First of all the axioms of set theory
by no means form a system closed in itself, but, quite on the contrary,
the very concept of set on which they are based suggests their extension
by new axioms which assert the existence of still further iterations of the
operation “set of”... The simplest of these strong “axioms of infinity”
asserts the existence of inaccessible numbers (in the weaker or stronger
sense) > ℵ0... Other axioms of infinity have first been formulated by
P. Mahlo. These axioms show clearly, not only that the axiomatic sys-
tem of set theory as used today is incomplete, but also that it can be
supplemented without arbitrariness by new axioms which only unfold
the content of the concept of set explained above.’2 Thus, axioms as-
serting the existence of inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals are offered as
examples of large-cardinal axioms which are intrinsically justified.
Speaking then of extrinsic justifications, he goes on to say ‘Secondly,
however, even disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some new axiom,
1See [14], pp. 258-9.
2See [14], pp. 260-1.
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and even in case it has no intrinsic necessity at all, a probable deci-
sion about its truth is possible also in another way, namely, inductively
by studying its “success”. Success here means fruitfulness in conse-
quences, in particular in “verifiable” consequences, i.e. consequences
demonstrable without the new axiom, whose proofs with the help of
the new axiom, however, are considerably simpler and easier to dis-
cover, and make it possible to contract into one proof many different
proofs.’3 In a footnote Go¨del discusses the examples of axioms assert-
ing the existence of weakly compact, measurable, and strongly compact
cardinals, making it clear that there is no clear reason why these ax-
ioms should be thought to be intrinsically justified but that there are
good arguments for considering them to be extrinsically justified. Later
it was discovered that the weakly compact cardinals are precisely the
Π11-indescribable cardinals and some came to think that this could be
seen as part of a good intrinsic justification for their existence, but the
view that measurable and strongly compact cardinals are not intrinsi-
cally justified would probably still have been widely held up until quite
recently, when new reflection principles of Welch and Roberts, to be
briefly discussed at the end of the present paper, came to be considered.
Our concern in this paper is with the boundary between those large-
cardinal axioms which are intrinsically justified and those whose only
justification is extrinsic. We will be building on work of William Tait
and Peter Koellner investigating this question. In [5] William Tait con-
siders a certain family of reflection principles and attempts to motivate
the idea that they should be considered to be intrinsically justified.
(Actually, he speaks in terms of what can be justified from what he
calls the “bottom-up” conception of set which he outlines in his intro-
duction. Some of my remarks in the next section will clarify what is
involved in this conception. I am assuming that this could be taken
to be at least a special case of what should count as intrinsically jus-
tified in Go¨del’s sense.) He proves that these reflection principles are
strong enough to yield the existence of ineffable cardinals. However,
he also considers extensions of these reflection principles which were
later shown by Peter Koellner in [8] to be inconsistent. In the same
work Koellner was able to show that the reflection principles which
Tait considered which were a priori weaker than those he showed to
be inconsistent were consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal. Pe-
ter Koellner also proposed some related reflection principles, which he
showed were also consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal.
3See [14], p. 261.
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In [12] the author proposed a family of reflection principles which
subsumed all of the reflection principles discussed by Tait and Koell-
ner which were consistent, and proved that these were also consistent
relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal. I also proposed that they should be
considered to be intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative con-
ception of set, and attempted to suggest principled reasons for why
the reflection principles of Tait that had been found to be inconsistent
should not have been regarded as intrinsically justified (even before
their inconsistency had been discovered). In Section 2 we shall explore
in some detail the question of whether small large cardinals such as
inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals, and also the large cardinals consid-
ered in [5] and [12], should be regarded as intrinsically justified. In
Section 3 I shall formulate a new reflection principle which subsumes
all of the consistent reflection principles discussed in the previously
mentioned work of Tait, Koellner, and myself, and show that this re-
flection principle is consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal (and is
in fact equivalent to the existence of a remarkable cardinal). I shall
attempt to motivate the idea that this reflection principle too should
be considered to be intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative
conception of set.
2. Justifications for reflection principles
Our concern is with the boundary between those large-cardinal ax-
ioms which in some sense merely unfold what is already implicit in
the iterative conception of set, and those which have only an extrinsic
justification. We would do well, then, to begin by considering what
reasons Go¨del might have had for thinking that axioms asserting the
existence of inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals are intrinsically justified,
in the sense of merely unfolding what is already implicit in the iterative
conception of set. In exploring this question we will also be clarifying
what Tait has in mind speaking of the “bottom-up” conception of set.
It is well known, and was first observed in [15], that a schema assert-
ing reflection for first-order formulas with parameters – that is, that for
each formula φ(x1, x2, . . . xn) we have the axiom that if φ(x1, x2, . . . xn)
then (φ(x1, x2, . . . xn))
Vα for some ordinal α such that x1, x2, . . . xn ∈ Vα
– is implied by ZF. A slightly stronger version asserting for each for-
mula φ(x1, x2, . . . xn) that there is a proper class of ordinals α such
that, for all x1, x2, . . . xn ∈ Vα, φ(x1, x2 . . . xn) ≡ (φ(x1, x2, . . . xn))
Vα , is
equivalent, given Extensionality, Separation, and Foundation, to ZF.
The philosophical issues become tougher when we consider whether we
can meaningfully speak of higher-order properties of the universe and
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whether we should regard as justified reflection principles which reflect
some higher-order property of the universe V down to a level Vα, or
which posit the existence of a level Vκ such that all higher-order prop-
erties of a certain kind are reflected down to some level Vβ with β < κ,
where β may perhaps depend on which property is being reflected. In
particular, with regard to the first kind of reflection principle men-
tioned, if quantifiers of higher order over our domain of discourse are
meaningful then does that not indicate that the domain of discourse
cannot contain all sets? What can be the justification for higher-order
reflection principles?
In order to motivate higher-order reflection, let us explore some ideas
related to those considered by Tait in [5] in elaborating the content of
what he calls the “bottom-up” conception. Let us begin with the exam-
ple of motivating an inaccessible cardinal. It is known that a cardinal is
inaccessible if and only if it is Π0n-indescribable for all positive integers
n. To put it another way, this means that a cardinal κ is inaccessi-
ble, if and only if, given any first-order formula with a second-order
parameter φ(X) which is assumed to hold with the first-order quan-
tifiers relativised to Vκ and the second-order parameter equal to some
element in P(Vκ), there exists some ordinal α < κ with the property
that (φ(X ∩ Vα))
Vα. So any first-order formula with second-order pa-
rameters which is true in the level Vκ reflects down to a smaller level
Vα. How can we motivate the idea that such a level Vκ exists?
Let us imagine that Vα is a level of the universe consisting of all the
sets that we have built up so far, but which is still itself only a set.
(We might imagine that it is a model of first-order ZF, for example.)
Now suppose we have some second-order parameter X ⊆ Vα and some
first-order formula φ with the property that φ(X) witnesses the Π0n-
describability of Vα for some n, that is the formula together with the
parameter constitutes a “mark” for Vα which is not reflected down to
any lower level. Then this mark for Vα is a warrant for us concluding
that Vα cannot be all of V . We are therefore justified in adding one
more level.
The idea is that there is some foundation for saying that we are
justified in positing a level of the universe Vκ which is a closure point
for the process of building up new levels in this way. This is related
with Tait’s account of the “bottom-up” conception of set theory that he
gives in the introduction to [5]. That is, if we build up new levels of the
universe in this way, proceeding one step further whenever we encounter
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a “mark” for the level which represents all of what we have built up so
far, and taking limits at limit ordinals, then we will eventually reach a
point where this process has been exhausted and cannot proceed any
further, but the collection of sets thereby obtained is still not all of V .
We can motivate this by the idea that V is “undefinable”, whereas the
domain of sets that we can build up in this way should be regarded as
a definable entity. This idea serves as the motivation for higher-order
reflection principles.
The kind of idea we have been discussing here is an instance of a
principle, which Peter Koellner has dubbed the Relativised Cantorian
Principle, in [8], and which is also discussed by Tait in [5]. Cantor
wrote that if an initial segment of the sequence of ordinals is only
a set then it has a least strict upper bound. The phrase “is only a
set” can be replaced with other conditions for the existence of a least
strict upper bound, and for any given set of conditions it then becomes
plausible to postulate the existence of a level of the universe which is a
closure point for the process of obtaining new ordinals in this way. For
example, as we have just seen, the existence of a cardinal which is Π0n-
indescribable for all positive integers n (equivalently, an inaccessible
cardinal) can be motivated by the idea that if a level of the universe
is Π0n-describable for some n then it cannot be all of V , and so this is
a reasonable condition for the existence of a least strict upper bound
of all the ordinals obtained so far, and it is reasonable to postulate
the existence of a level of the universe which is a closure point for the
process of obtaining new ordinals in this way.
It may be objected to the Relativised Cantorian Principle that it
proves too much. For example, why should we not regard it as reason-
able to postulate a closure point for the process of moving on to a new
ordinal whenever the least strict upper bound of all the ordinals we
have constructed so far is not a supercompact cardinal? If we regard
it as justified to posit such a closure point then we have justified the
existence of a supercompact cardinal but surely this is an inadequate
justification for such a strong conclusion, and indeed there would be no
principled reason why this line of reasoning should not also be used to
motivate large cardinals that are known to be inconsistent with ZFC.
The idea here is that, in the case of the motivation for an inacces-
sible cardinal given before, we are dealing with a circumscribed set of
processes for building up new ordinals based on a certain limited set of
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circumstances under which we can say that we have warrant for con-
cluding that the level of the universe we have built up so far is not all of
V . This on the other hand is not the case with the previous example of
an obviously inadequate justification for a supercompact cardinal. Of
course we always know that at any given stage the level of the universe
we have obtained so far is not all of V , or it would not be meaningful to
speak of its higher-order properties at all. But we only actually pass on
to a higher ordinal under a certain circumscribed set of circumstances
under which we know that we have warrant for saying that the level
obtained so far is not all of V , where we can tell this simply by looking
at the properties of the level we have built up so far (possibly together
with some parameters from the ambient universe, such as higher-order
parameters over the level Vα built up so far, as in the example we have
given). Thus, we regard it as part of the iterative conception of set
that any candidate for V which is in some way “describable” cannot
be all of V , and that a witness to the “describability” is a warrant for
concluding this. And we also regard it as part of the iterative concep-
tion that if we have some circumscribed set of processes for building up
new levels Vα based on some circumscribed set of circumstances under
which we have warrant for concluding that the level we built up so far
is not all of V , then there is a level which is a closure point for this
circumscribed set of processes. This can once again be motivated by
the idea that V should not be “definable”. This line of thought can
be seen as giving principled reasons why the applications of the Rel-
ativised Cantorian Principle which justify reflection principles should
be seen as justified, but not those which lead to inconsistency, or to
obviously inadequate justifications of extremely strong large-cardinal
axioms.
So long as we consider only reflection of higher-order formulas with
second-order parameters, this could be seen as a good motivation for
various types of indescribable cardinals. But when we move to third-
order parameters and higher we encounter a difficulty: unrestricted
reflection with such parameters leads to inconsistency, as was first ob-
served by Reinhardt in [16], and the first detailed proof of which in the
literature was given by Tait in [5].
If we are to countenance some forms of higher-order reflection involv-
ing parameters of third order or higher then what principled reasons
can we offer for distinguishing it from those forms of reflection with
such parameters which are known to be inconsistent? It is at this
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point in our discussion where we start to consider the large cardinals
considered in [5] and [12].
Let us consider what Tait writes in [5] on the question of how to
justify special cases of reflection with parameters of third and higher
order.
“One plausible way to think about the difference between reflecting
ϕ(A) when A is second-order and when it is of higher-order is that,
in the former case, reflection is asserting that, if ϕ(A) holds in the
structure 〈R(κ),∈, A〉, then it holds in the substructure 〈R(β),∈, Aβ〉
for some β < κ . . . But, when A is higher-order, say of third-order this
is no longer so. Now we are considering the structure 〈R(κ), R(κ+1),
∈, A〉 and 〈R(β), R(β+1),∈, Aβ〉. But, the latter is not a substructure
of the former, that is the ‘inclusion map’ of the latter structure into the
former is no longer single-valued: for subclasses X and Y of R(κ), X 6=
Y does not imply Xβ 6= Y β. Likewise for X ∈ R(κ + 1), X /∈ A does
not imply Xβ /∈ Aβ. For this reason, the formulas that we can expect
to be preserved in passing from the former structure to the latter must
be suitably restricted and, in particular, should not contain the relation
/∈ between second- and third-order objects or the relation 6= between
second-order objects.”
He then uses these ideas to motivate the following family of reflection
principles.
Definition 2.1. A formula in the nth-order language of set theory, for
some n < ω, is positive iff it is built up by means of the operations ∨,
∧, ∀, ∃ from atoms of the form x = y, x 6= y, x ∈ y, x /∈ y, x ∈ Y (2),
x /∈ Y (2) and X(m) = X ′(m) and X(m) ∈ Y (m+1), where m ≥ 2.
Definition 2.2. For a first-order or second-order variable A, and a
finite ordinal n, we define An× = {〈n, x〉 | x ∈ A}, A/n = {x | 〈n, x〉 ∈
A}, and for variables B of order greater than the second we define, by
induction on the order of the variable, Bn× = {Xn× | X ∈ B}, B/n =
{X/n | X ∈ B}, and for A and B of the same order A+B = A0×∪B1×.
Compositions of these operations are called contracting operations, and
a formula is said to be positive in the extended sense if it is obtained
from a positive formula by substitution for free variables of terms in-
volving contracting operations.
Definition 2.3. For 0 < n < ω, Γ
(2)
n is the class of formulas
∀X
(2)
1 ∃Y
(k1)
1 · · · ∀X
(2)
n ∃Y
(kn)
n ϕ(X
(2)
1 , Y
(k1)
1 , . . . , X
(2)
n , Y
(kn)
n , A
(l1), . . .A(ln′ ))
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where ϕ is positive in the extended sense and does not have quanti-
fiers or second or higher-order and k1, . . . kn, l1, . . . ln′ are natural num-
bers.
Definition 2.4. We say that Vκ satisfies Γ
(2)
n -reflection if, for all ϕ ∈
Γ
(2)
n , if
Vκ |= ϕ(A
(m1), A(m2), . . . A(mp)) then Vκ |= ϕ
δ(A(m1),δ, A(m2),δ, . . . A(mp),δ)
for some δ < κ.
Peter Koellner established in [8] that these reflection principles are
consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal. In [5] Tait proposes to define
Γ
(m)
n in the same way as the class of formulas Γ
(2)
n , except that universal
quantifiers of order ≤ m are permitted. Koellner shows in [8] that this
form of reflection is inconsistent when m > 2.
This raises the issue of whether we have principled grounds for refus-
ing to accept those reflection principles of Tait which Peter Koellner
proved to be inconsistent. In [12] I suggested a possible principled
ground. Given a formula in the higher-order language of set theory, it
is possible to introduce Skolem functions and re-write it as a formula
with universal quantifiers alone and the Skolem functions as parame-
ters. Then just as Tait appealed to the idea that the inclusion map of a
structure (Vβ, Vβ+1,∈) into a structure (Vκ, Vκ+1,∈) is not single-valued
when β < κ as a motivation for refusing to accept a “naive” form of
third-order reflection which is easily proved to be inconsistent, so we
can appeal to the idea that the Skolem functions witnessing the truth
of a higher-order formula in Vκ may cease to be single-valued when
we reflect down to Vβ, to motivate refusing to accept those reflection
principles of Tait which Koellner proved to be inconsistent. But on the
other hand this still allows for plausible motivations to be given for the
reflection principles discussed in [12] and the present paper.
In [12] I proposed the following large-cardinal axiom and attempted
to provide motivation for it based on the ideas above.
Definition 2.5. We define l(γ) = γ − 1 if 0 < γ < ω and l(γ) =
γ otherwise. We extend the definition A(m+1),β = {B(m),β | B(m) ∈
A(m+1)} to A(α),β = {Bβ | B ∈ A(α)} for all ordinals α > 0, it being
understood that if Vκ is the domain of discourse then A
(α) ranges over
Vκ+l(α).
Definition 2.6. Suppose that α, κ are ordinals such that 0 < α < κ
and that
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(1) S = 〈{Vκ+γ | γ < α},∈, f1, f2, . . . fk, A1, A2, . . .
An〉 is a structure where each fi is a function Vκ+l(γ1) × Vκ+l(γ2) ×
. . . Vκ+l(γi) → Vκ+ζi for some ordinals γ1, γ2, . . . γi, ζi such that
l(γ1), l(γ2), . . . l(γi) < α, 0 < ζi < α, and each Ai is a subset of Vκ+δi
for some δi < α
(2) ϕ is a formula true in the structure S, of the form
∀X
(γ1)
1 ∀X
(γ2)
2 · · · ∀X
(γk)
k
ψ(X
(γ1)
1 , f1(X
(γ1)
1 ), X
(γ2)
2 , f2(X
(γ1)
1 , X
(γ2)
2 ), . . .X
(γk)
k , fk(X
(γ1)
1 , X
(γ2)
2 , . . .X
(γk)
k ),
A1, A2, . . . Aj) with ψ a formula with first-order quantifiers only
(3) there exists a β such that α < β < κ and a mapping j : Vβ+α →
Vκ+α, such that j(X) ∈ Vκ+γ whenever X ∈ Vβ+γ, j(X) = X for all
X ∈ Vβ, and j(X) ∈ j(Y ) whenever X ∈ Y , and such that, in the
structure
Sβ = 〈Vβ, {Vβ+γ | 0 < γ < α}, {Vκ+γ | 0 < γ < α},∈, j, f1, f2, . . . fk, A1, A2 . . .
An〉, with variables of order γ ranging over Vβ+l(γ), we have
(∗)∀X
(γ1)
1 ∀X
(γ2)
2 · · · ∀X
(γk)
k
ψ(j(X
(γ1)
1 ), f1(j(X
(γ1)
1 )), j(X
(γ2)
2 ), f2(j(X
(γ1)
1 ), j(X
(γ2)
2 )), . . . j(X
(γk)
k ),
fk(j(X
(γ1)
1 ), j(X
(γ2)
2 ), . . . j(X
(γk)
k )), A1, A2, . . .An)
Then we say that the formula ϕ with parameters A1, A2, . . .An reflects
down from S to β. If for all structures S of the above form and for all
formulas ϕ of the above form true in the structure S, this occurs for
some β < κ, then κ is said to be α-reflective. 4
Since in this definition I have introduced a mapping j to guide the
reflection it may be questioned whether it still deserves to be called a
reflection principle. I tried to motivate the acceptance of the existence
of cardinals satisfying the above large-cardinal property as intrinsically
justified by deriving it from yet another large-cardinal property. Specif-
ically one may introduce the notion of an α-hyper-reflective cardinal
for α > 0. We do this by means of a definition identical to Defini-
tion 2.6, except that we have the higher-order variables of order γ in
(*) of Definition 2.6 range over Vκ+l(γ) rather than Vβ+l(γ), and remove
4At the time of writing [12] I was under the impression that the phrase
“α-reflective cardinal” had not been used previously. This turned out not to
be correct. Dmytro Taranovsky had introduced a completely different notion
of “α-reflective cardinal” independently in a paper “Higher Order Set Theory
with Reflective Cardinals” which at the time of writing is available on-line at
http://web.mit.edu/dmytro/www/ReflectiveCardinals.htm. It should be empha-
sised that my notion of “α-reflective cardinal” is completely different to the notion
introduced in Taranovsky’s paper.
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reference to the mapping j. It is also necessary to require that the
formula being reflected not contain subformulas of the form X = Y for
variables X, Y of order at least second order, in order for the resulting
reflection principle to be consistent, this point was not noticed in [12].
One can then proceed to prove (assuming the axiom of choice) that
an α-hyper-reflective cardinal is α-reflective. It is more plausible to
think of an axiom positing the existence of an α-hyper-reflective car-
dinal as a reflection principle. The considerations discussed above as
to why we have principled reasons for rejecting those reflection princi-
ples of Tait’s which are known to be inconsistent also suggest that the
α-hyper-reflective cardinals might be regarded as intrinsically justified.
Of course, if the point of view being put forward here is correct
and this is the right way to formulate reflection principles, that is by
taking more complex formulas in purely universally quantified form
with Skolem functions as parameters, then that means we were a bit
too quick earlier to say that we had given a good motivation for the
indescribable cardinals, and some care would be needed to justify, for
example, a Π12-indescribable cardinal from this point of view.
The choice of the term “hyper-reflective” is unfortunate; it is actually
not hard to construct an argument that a cardinal κ is α-reflective if and
only if it is α-hyper-reflective, for any ordinal α such that 0 < α < κ.
Lemma 2.7. For each ordinal α > 0, a cardinal κ is α-hyper-reflective
if and only if it is α-reflective.
Proof. The forward direction is easy. For the other direction, suppose
that κ is α-reflective. Suppose that we have a formula of the form (*)
in Definition 2.6, together with parameters corresponding to the free
variables in the formula, including the variables for the Skolem func-
tions, and satisfying the constraint that the formula has no subformula
of the form X = Y for formulas of at least second order, and that a
mapping j witnesses that this formula reflects down to β for those pa-
rameters. Let us replace the Skolem functions with their restrictions to
the range of the mapping j, we shall show that these restricted Skolem
functions can be extended to Skolem functions on the entire domains of
discourse for the higher-order variables such that the cardinal κ satis-
fies the definition of α-hyper-reflectiveness for the formula in question
with that choice of tuple of Skolem functions and other parameters,
and if that can be shown for an arbitrary initial choice of formula and
parameters, then that is sufficient to show that κ satisfies the defini-
tion of α-hyper-reflectiveness in general. Assume the mapping j and
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the ordinal β chosen so that the mapping j will witness that all other
formulas of the form (*) – with the same number of initial higher-order
quantifiers and the same free variables including Skolem function vari-
ables – are also reflected down to the same β for the original choice of
parameters and Skolem functions. It can be seen that such a choice of
j and β is possible, by considering the existence of a truth predicate
for the class of formulas of the type being discussed, and applying the
definition of being α-reflective to a formula involving that truth predi-
cate. We shall show that on these assumptions it is always possible to
extend the Skolem functions to the entire range of possible values for
the appropriate higher-order variables, in such a way that the result-
ing choice of Skolem functions witnesses that the cardinal κ satisfies
the definition of being α-hyper-reflective for that particular choice of
formula and parameters and Skolem functions, and as observed before
showing that this is true regardless of the initial choice of formula and
Skolem functions and parameters is sufficient to prove the theorem.
Suppose that we are given an interpretation for each of the higher-
order variables which appear in universally quantified form at the start
of the original formula of the form (*), where not every value of such a
higher-order variable is in the range of the mapping j. To extend the
Skolem functions to every such tuple of values for the higher-order vari-
ables, use the values of the Skolem functions for tuples of elements of
the range of j as a guide. Assume that we are trying to determine what
the value of the Skolem function fk(X1, X2, . . .Xk) should be, and as-
sume as an induction hypothesis that we have already chosen values for
fj(X1, X2, . . .Xj) for j < k, and parameters k(X1), k(X2), . . . k(Xk−1)
in the range of the mapping j, such that any first-order formula with
higher-order parameters is true of a tuple of parameters chosen from
{X1, f1(X1), X2, f2(X1, X2), . . .Xk−1, fk−1(X1, X2, . . .Xk−1)} if and only
if it is true of the corresponding tuple of parameters from {k(X1),
f1(k(X1)), k(X2), f2(k(X1), k(X2)), . . . k(Xk−1), fk−1(k(X1), k(X2), . . .
k(Xk−1))}. Then by our assumptions on the mapping j we can choose
values for k(Xk) and fk(X1, X2, . . .Xk) so that the induction step goes
through. If the Skolem functions are defined in this way for every pos-
sible tuple of parameters then these Skolem functions will witness that
κ satisfies the definition of being α-hyper-reflective for this particular
formula and choice of parameters, and the initial choice of formula and
Skolem functions and parameters was arbitrary. As observed previ-
ously, this is sufficient to prove that every α-reflective cardinal is α-
hyper-reflective, completing the proof of equivalence between the two
properties. 
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In [12] I gave a proof of the consistency of these large cardinals
relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal. In the next section I want to extend
this program further by formulating a stronger reflection principle and
giving a consistency proof for it.
3. The new reflection principle
We begin by presenting one version of the new reflection principle, a
natural generalization of the notion of an α-hyper-reflective cardinal.
Definition 3.1. A cardinal κ is said to be extremely reflective if, for
each ordinal λ > κ, considering structures of the form (Vκ, Vλ \ Vκ)
and formulas φ in a two-sorted language holding in such a structure, of
the same form as the formulas considered in the definition of α-hyper-
reflective cardinal except that variables of at least second order are
replaced with variables of the second sort, each such formula reflects
down to some β < κ in the same sense as in the definition of α-hyper-
reflective cardinal. (Here we must recall that the constraint that the
reflected formula has no subformula of the form X = Y where X and
Y are variables of the second sort is necessary.)
We now present an alternative definition of the same concept and
then briefly indicate how one can prove that the two definitions are
equivalent.
Definition 3.2. Suppose that κ is a cardinal with the following prop-
erty. For any ordinal η > κ, and for any formula φ of the form described
in the previous definition, there exists an ordinal λη < κ, and a fam-
ily of sets Mφ,a (not necessarily transitive) for all a ∈ Vη \ Vκ, with
Card(Mφ,a) ≤ λη, and mappings jφ,a :Mφ,a → Vη, for each a ∈ Vη \ Vκ,
such that Vλη ∪{λη} ⊆Mφ,a for all a ∈ Vη \Vκ,
⋃
a∈Vη\Vκ
Mφ,a = Vρη for
some ρη, and for all a ∈ Vη \ Vκ the mapping jφ,a is elementary from
(Vλη ,Mφ,a \ Vλη) into (Vκ, Vη \ Vκ), for all formulas of the same form
as φ (that is, the form described in the previous definition, with the
constraint on subformulas of the form X = Y ) such that the num-
ber of free variables (including free variables for Skolem functions)
is no greater than that of φ, with critical point λη and such that
jφ,a(λη) = κ, and a ∈ range(jφ,a). We also require that given any
n-tuple (a1, a2, . . . an) the mapping jφ,(a1,a2,...an) has domain containing
the domains of jφ,a1 , jφ,a2 , . . . jφ,an and agrees with the map jφ,ak at ak
for each k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n. If κ has this property then κ is said
to be an extremely reflective cardinal.
Using a similar argument to the one used to show that a cardinal is
α-hyper-reflective if and only if it is α-reflective, together with the use
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of Skolem hulls, the first definition can be shown to be equivalent to
the second one. To show that the first definition implies the second,
use a sequence of formulas each of which is universal for a given level
of complexity, and choose a sequence of families of Skolem functions
for each such formula such that the families of Skolem functions in
the sequence and consistent with one another, and use these families of
Skolem functions to construct the maps jφ,a. It may not be immediately
obvious that λη can be chosen independently of φ, but simply choose
it to be as small as possible for each φ, then it can be easily seen that
the resulting ordinal is independent of φ. To show that it is possible to
choose the Mφ,a in such a way that
⋃
a∈Vη\Vκ
Mφ,a = Vρη , consider that
each Mφ,a could be embedded in an M constructed from a Skolem hull
of larger cardinality but still of smaller cardinality than iκ, so that
Vδ+1 ∈ M where j(δ) = rank(a), j being the mapping corresponding
to the Skolem hull M . This indicates how it can be shown that the
first definition implies the second, and it can be shown that the second
implies the first using similar reason to that used to show that every
α-reflective cardinal is α-hyper-reflective.
It can be shown that this reflection principle subsumes all the ones
considered in [5], [8], and [12]. In fact it can be shown that an extremely
reflective cardinal κ is α-reflective for all ordinals α such that 0 < α < κ
(and is a stationary limit of cardinals with this property). This point
can easily be argued making use of the first definition given. The
motivation for accepting extremely reflective cardinals as intrinsically
justified is similar to the motivation for accepting α-hyper-reflective
cardinals as intrinsically justified.
One easy upper bound for the consistency strength of an extremely
reflective cardinal is that every supercompact cardinal is extremely
reflective. This can be shown using Magidor’s characterisation of su-
percompactness. It is also not hard to show that a measurable cardinal
is a stationary limit of extremely reflective cardinals.
Before proceeding further, we note two errata in [12]. In the proof of
Theorem 2.5 of [12] it is said that given any closed unbounded subset
C ⊆ κ(ω), where κ(ω) is the first ω-Erdo˝s cardinal, one may choose
an ω-sequence of indiscernibles for any structure S with domain of
discourse Vκ(ω) which lie in C. More needs to be said for the argument
to work. It must be required that it be possible to choose the set
of indiscernibles I ⊆ C in such a way that each element of I is a
critical point of an elementary embedding from the Skolem hull of I
INTRINSICALLY JUSTIFIED REFLECTION PRINCIPLES 15
in S into itself. Fortunately this is possible as well. Further it was
claimed that κ(ω) is a stationary limit of remarkable cardinals. What
should have been said is that it is a stationary limit of cardinals κ with
the property that Vκ(ω) |= “κ is remarkable”. This result is Lemma
1.2 of [10]. Having noted these errata, we now proceed to the next
result, showing that the property of being extremely reflective is in
fact equivalent to the property of being remarkable.
Theorem 3.3. A cardinal is extremely reflective if and only if it is
remarkable.
Proof. This is a corollary of the second definition given of “extremely
reflective cardinal”, and the following characterisation of remarkable
cardinals which Ralf Schindler communicated to me in private email
correspondence, saying that it was known to him at the time that [18]
appeared, and is in the spirit of Section 4 of that paper, but may not
be explicitly stated there. Let κ be an infinite cardinal. We consider
two two-player games. The first one will be denoted by G1κ. Player
I plays an ordinal α > κ, player II plays two ordinals λ, β such that
λ < β < κ, then from then on Player I plays elements x0, x1, . . . of Vβ
and Player II plays elements y0, y1, . . . of Vα, and player II wins if she
is not the first one to break the following rules: xk ∈ Vλ =⇒ yk = xk,
and for every formula φ in the language of set theory and for all k < ω,
Vβ |= φ(λ, x0, . . . xk−1) ≡ Vα |= φ(κ, y0, . . . yk−1). The second game is
denoted Gcritκ , and this time after the first two moves, Player I plays
X0, Player II plays j0, Player I plays X1, Player II plays j1, and so on,
and the rules are X0 ⊂ X1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Vβ, j0 ⊂ j1 ⊂ . . ., and for all k < ω,
Card(Xk) ≤ λ, jk : Xk → Vα, jk ↾ Xk ∩ Vλ = id, and for every formula
φ in the language of set theory, for all n < ω, and for all x0, x1, . . . xn ∈
Xk, Vβ |= φ(λ, x0, x1, . . . xn) ≡ Vα |= φ(κ, jk(x0), jk(x1), . . . jk(xn)).
Again Player II wins if she is the first one not to break any rule. Ralf
Schindler has shown that κ being remarkable is equivalent to Player II
having a winning strategy in G1κ, which is in turn equivalent to Player
II having a winning strategy in Gcritκ .
5 Using this characterisation of
remarkable cardinals and our previous characterisation of extremely re-
flective cardinals, it can be shown that the two concepts are equivalent.
If we assume that κ is remarkable in the sense just given then it is easy
to see that κ is extremely reflective according to our second definition,
and the converse is easy to show too, namely the winning strategy for
player II in G1κ is the one whereby she plays yi := jφ,(x0,x1,...xi)(xi) where
5A note containing the proof of this claim is currently available at
https : //ivv5hpp.uni−muenster.de/u/rds/alternative characterization.pdf.
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φ has a sufficiently large number of free variables. Any violation of the
rules would then witness a failure of the defining property for some
jψ,b with x0, x1, . . . xi ∈ dom jψ,b and ψ having enough free variables to
cover both the complexity of the formula for which the rules are broken
as well as all the free variables in that formula. 
It now follows by Lemma 1.2 of [10] that extremely reflective cardi-
nals are consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal.
If one is interested in the question of which reflection principles in-
volving higher-order formulas and parameters of third or higher order
are intrinsically justified, the large cardinals considered in [12] and the
present paper seem to be the correct generalisation.
We conclude the paper with some remarks on how the result that
the extremely reflective cardinals are precisely the remarkable cardi-
nals can be seen as philosophically significant. The motivation for the
existence of an extremely reflective cardinal as an intrinsically justified
large-cardinal axiom has been discussed. The motivation given was on
the basis of an Absolutist conception of the universe of sets, in the sense
characterised in [3], that is on the basis of a conception of the universe
of sets as one single universe which cannot be extended in either height
of width. In [11], it is shown that the remarkable cardinals are precisely
the virtually supercompact cardinals. Given a large-cardinal property
which can be formulated in terms of the existence of set-sized embed-
dings j : Vα → Vβ, the corresponding virtual large-cardinal property
is the existence in V [G] for some set forcing extension V [G] of V of
an embedding j : V Vα → V
V
β , or family of such embeddings, with the
required properties. Thus we see that the most illuminating definition
of the property of being extremely reflective (or, equivalently, being re-
markable) is formulated with reference to set-sized forcing extensions of
the universe, a notion which can of course only be taken literally if one
assumes what Barton and Friedman refer to as “width multiversism”,
an ontology for set theory based on a multiverse conception where any
given universe of sets can be extended in width. Similarly, the notion
of α-reflective can be formulated as a virtual large-cardinal property.
Although the significance of the notion of a forcing extension is
widely accepted by the mathematical community, the philosophical
community still seems largely to hold the view that this notion is simply
a device for establishing relative consistency statements. Our investi-
gations strengthen the case for the intrinsic philosophical significance
of this notion, and for the idea that the notion of a width extension
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of the universe is crucial to achieving a better understanding of the
universe of sets itself.
Finally we briefly suggest a further line of possible investigation.
Reflection principles stronger than an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal have been pro-
posed by Welch and Roberts in [1] and [2] in response to Peter Koell-
ner’s challenge to formulate an intrinsically justified reflection princi-
ple with that level of consistency strength. In particular, Sam Roberts
has formulated a reflection principle which implies a proper class of 1-
extendible cardinals, and along lines which I will indicate in a different
forthcoming paper on the topic, this line of thought can be taken at
least up to the level of a supercompact cardinal. For attempted justifi-
cations from notions of reflection of still stronger large cardinals, in [17]
Victoria Marshall motivates increasingly strong theories from notions
of reflection which go all the way up to inconsistency with the axiom
of choice. In future work I hope to present a set of ideas which offer
principled reasons for why, if one is willing to accept the principles of
Welch and Roberts as intrinsically justified, one might then have good
reason to accept all those large cardinals not known to be inconsistent
with the axiom of choice but stop short of the point of inconsistency
with choice. Combining these lines of investigation with the ideas to
be found in the present paper, there is a possibility of defending a
notion of intrinsic justification which extends to at least the virtually
rank-into-rank cardinals but not to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal. Determining
whether such a view can be formulated as a coherent view about the
epistemology of large cardinals should be a fruitful research project.
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